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“COME  NOW  LET  US  REASON  TOGETHER”:
RESTORING  RELIGIOUS  FREEDOM  IN
AMERICA  AND  ABROAD
John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols*
I. POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
American religious freedom used to be “taken for granted.”  It’s now “up
for grabs.”  So writes distinguished religious liberty scholar Paul Horwitz.1
Until a generation ago, the opposite was true.  In 1993, a virtually unanimous
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), signed by
President Clinton.2  This was a firm national rebuke of the 1990 Supreme
Court case of Employment Division v. Smith3 that had greatly weakened the
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.  Four years later, the Court struck
down the application of RFRA to the states.4  In 2000, Congress stood up
again and passed the more targeted Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
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educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the
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* John Witte, Jr. is Robert W. Woodruff University Professor of Law; McDonald
Distinguished Professor; and Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at
Emory University.  Joel A. Nichols is Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of
Law at the University of St. Thomas (MN) Law School, and Senior Fellow at the Center for
the Study of Law and Religion at Emory.  This Article is drawn in part from JOHN WITTE, JR.
& JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (4th ed.
2016) and used with permission of the publisher, Oxford University Press.  The title is
quoted from Isaiah 1:18 (Revised Standard Version).  We are grateful to Valerie Aggerbeck
and Justin Latterell for their assistance.  This Article was first delivered by John Witte as the
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Howard Corporation Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame Law School.
1 Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 155 (2014) (quot-
ing Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory
Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1837 (1997)).
2 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993).
3 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
4 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  RFRA still applies to federal laws. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
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Persons Act (RLUIPA), also signed by President Clinton, a law that was bind-
ing on federal and state governments alike and enforceable in the federal
courts.5  Twenty-one state legislatures eventually passed their own state relig-
ious freedom statutes, mostly modeled on the federal act.6  And both Con-
gress and the states added a number of other discrete protections for
religion, giving courts some of the tools they needed to protect religious free-
dom, even without a strong First Amendment.7
So matters stood a generation ago.  But in the ensuing years, these spe-
cial legislative protections of religious freedom have come under increasing
attack.  Several states of late, including relatively conservative bastions like
Georgia8 and Indiana,9 have buckled under massive lobbying and media
(applying RFRA in a claim about the regulation of a Schedule I narcotic for sacramental
purposes).
5 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (2000); see Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (applying RLUIPA); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge pertaining to “institutionalized persons”).
6 See Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemp-
tions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63 (2015); Christopher C.
Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia have RFRAs: ALA. CONST. art. I,
§ 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-401 (West
2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (West
2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 (West 2016); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 35/1 (West
2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5301 (West 2016) ; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2016);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-61-1 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 1.302 (West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251
(West 2016); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2016); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 80.1-1 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-10 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407
(West 2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-2.02 (West 2016).
7 See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-
Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021 (2012); Lund, supra note 6, at 479–89.
8 Jim Galloway, Gearing Up for Next ‘Religious Liberty’ Fight, Georgia Business Leaders Look
to Indiana, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 17, 2015), http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2015/10/17/
gearing-up-for-next-religious-liberty-fight-georgia-business-leaders-look-to-indiana/.
9 Emily Bazelon, What Are the Limits of ‘Religious Liberty’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 7,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/magazine/what-are-the-limits-of-religious-
liberty.html; Tony Cook et al., Indiana Governor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, USA
TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indi-
ana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gay-discrimination/70819106/; Monica Davey et al., Indi-
ana and Arkansas Revise Rights Bills, Seeking to Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/indiana-arkansas-religious-freedom-bill
.html?_r=0; Amanda Holpuch, Indiana Amends Religious Freedom Bill to Put an End to Discrimi-
nation, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/02/
indiana-republicans-religious-freedom.
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pressure, and have scrapped or vetoed their new or revised RFRA plans;
other states have started to limit the application of their existing RFRAs.10
There are many causes for this change of legislative heart.  First, highly
publicized religious pathologies have made it more difficult to sympathize
with the cause of religion and religious freedom.  Particularly, the rise of
Islamicism, and the horrors of 9/11, London’s 7/7, Fort Hood, Madrid,
Paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, Orlando, Nice, and more have renewed
traditional warnings about the dangers of religion in general and triggered
fresh waves of “anti-Shari’a statutes”11 and harsh treatment of Muslims by
regulators and courts.12  Leading political figures now advocate a “‘total and
complete’ ban” on Muslims entering the United States 13 and urge that the
United States should “test every person here who is of a Muslim background,
and if they believe in sharia, they should be deported.”14  Second, the media
narrative has turned more against legislative protections.  For example, in
2006, The New York Times ran a sensational six-part expose´ describing the
“hundreds” of special statutory and regulatory protections, entitlements, and
exemptions that religious individuals and groups quietly enjoy under federal,
state, and local laws, despite all the loud lamentations about the Smith case’s
truncation of religious freedom.15  Third, the Catholic Church was rocked by
an avalanche of news reports and lawsuits about the pedophilia of delinquent
priests and cover-ups by complicit bishops—all committed under the thick
10 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
839, 871 (2014).
11 For more detailed treatment and criticism of the anti-Shari’a statutes, see the discus-
sion and sources in John Witte, Jr., & Joel A. Nichols, Who Governs the Family? Marriage and
Divorce as a New Test Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 321 (2013).
12 See LORI PEEK, BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11, at 16 (2011)
(“In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Muslims experienced a dramatic increase in the
frequency and intensity of these hostile encounters.”); see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael
Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal
Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012); Asma T. Uddin, American Muslims, American Islam, and
the American Constitutional Heritage, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA: CONSTITUTIONAL
ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 224, 224–40 (Allen D. Hertzke ed., 2015).
13 Jenna Johnson & David Weigel, Donald Trump Calls for ‘Total’ Ban on Muslims Enter-
ing United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2015/12/07/e56266f6-9d2b-11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html (quoting Donald Trump’s
statement from December 7, 2015).
14 Aaron Blake, Gingrich Says the Media Is Distorting His Plan to ‘Test’ All Muslims. But
That’s What He Proposed, WASH. POST (July 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/15/newt-gingrich-says-the-media-is-overreacting-to-his-plan-to-
test-all-muslims-but-thats-what-he-proposed/?tid=a_inl (offering a transcript of Newt Ging-
rich’s comments from July 14, 2016).
15 Diana B. Henriques, In God’s Name, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8–11, 20; Nov. 23; Dec. 19,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/ref/business/churchstate.html; see Diana B. Henriques &
Andrew W. Lehren, Religious Groups Reap Federal Aid for Pet Projects, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/business/13lobby.html; Diana B. Henriques
& Andrew W. Lehren, Federal Grant for a Medical Mission Goes Awry, N.Y. TIMES (June 13,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/business/13cutter.html.
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constitutional veil of religious autonomy.16  Fourth, Evangelical
megachurches faced withering attacks for their massive embezzlement of
funds, and the lush and luxurious lifestyles of their pastors—all the while
enjoying tax exemptions for their incomes, properties, and parsonages.17
But even bigger challenges of late have come with the new culture wars
between religious freedom and sexual freedom.18  The legal questions for
religious freedom are mounting.  Must a religious official with conscientious
scruples marry a same-sex or interreligious couple?  How about a justice of
the peace or a military chaplain?  Or a county clerk asked to give them a
marriage license?19  Must devout medical doctors or religiously chartered
hospitals perform abortions, or give assisted-reproduction procedures to
unwed mothers, contrary to their deeply held religious beliefs about mar-
riage and family life?  How about if they are receiving government funding?
Or if they are the only medical service available to the patient for miles
around?  Must a conscientiously opposed pharmacist fill a prescription for a
contraceptive or abortifacient?20  Or a private employer carry medical insur-
ance for the same prescriptions?  What if these are franchises of bigger phar-
macies or employers that insist on these services?  May a religious
organization dismiss or discipline its officials or members because of their
sexual orientation or sexual practices, or because they had a divorce, abor-
tion, or same-sex marriage?  May private religious citizens refuse to photo-
graph or cater a wedding, rent an apartment, or offer a general service to a
same-sex couple whose relationship they find religiously or morally
16 See, e.g., John Gehring, False Choices and Religious Liberty: Is There a Better Way For-
ward?, COMMONWEAL (June 21, 2016), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/false-
choices-religious-liberty; Amanda Holpuch, Ongoing Child Sex Abuse in Catholic Church Casts
Shadow on Pope’s U.S. Visit, GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/sep/10/pope-francis-us-visit-catholic-sex-abuse; Alexander Stille, What Pope
Benedict Knew About Abuse in the Catholic Church, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www
.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-pope-benedict-knew-about-abuse-in-the-catholic-
church.
17 See, e.g., John Montague, The Law and Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsider-
ing the Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 203 (2013); Press Release, U.S. Senator
Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-Based Ministries (Nov. 6,
2007), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-seeks-information-six-
media-based-ministries.
18 For overviews, see RYAN T. ANDERSON, TRUTH OVERRULED: THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2015); Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-
Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Laycock, supra note 10. R
19 Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky.) (ruling against a county clerk who
refused to issue same-sex marriage licenses), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 23 (2015).
20 See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving pharma-
cists’ challenge to regulations requiring the disbursing of potential embryo-destructive
medications), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2433 (2016).
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improper21—especially when state non-discrimination laws command
otherwise?22
These are only a few of the headline issues today, which officials and
citizens are struggling mightily to address.  Two recent 5-4 Supreme Court
cases on point have only exacerbated the tension.  In Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez (2010),23 sexual non-discrimination rights trumped religious free-
dom claims; in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014),24 religious freedom trumped
reproductive freedom claims.25  The culture wars have only escalated as a
consequence.  “Each side is intolerant of the other; each side wants a total
win,” Douglas Laycock writes, after a thorough study of these new culture
wars.26  “This mutual insistence on total wins is very bad for religious lib-
erty.”27  And with easy political talk afoot about repealing unpopular stat-
utes—not just the Affordable Care Act—legislative protections for religious
freedom appear vulnerable.  Add the fact that both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses are now much weaker protections than they were
before the 1980s, and it is hard to resist the judgment of leading jurist Mary
Ann Glendon that religious freedom is in danger of becoming “a second-
class right.”28
II. ACADEMIC CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
That’s exactly how it should be, say a number of legal scholars who have
challenged the idea that religion is special or deserving of special constitu-
tional or legislative protection.29  Even if this idea existed in the eighteenth-
21 See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (ruling against a
photographer who claimed religious exemption from a state public accommodation stat-
ute with respect to same-sex weddings), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
22 For good overviews see FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2016); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY
RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Timothy Shah et al. eds.,
2016); Laycock, supra note 10. R
23 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
24 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (finding that a for-profit
company could assert religious liberty rights in conscientious opposition to providing cer-
tain kinds of contraceptive care to employees).
25 See also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (responding to arguments from
religious organizations that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate vio-
lated RFRA because it required them to facilitate the provision of insurance coverage that
they opposed on religious grounds, and deciding to vacate and remand after supplemental
briefing indicated a possible functional resolution that would retain coverage and also
respect the asserted religious rights).
26 Laycock, supra note 10, at 879; see also Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Relig- R
ious Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231, 231–55 (Micah Schwartz-
man et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter THE RISE].
27 Laycock, supra note 10, at 879. R
28 Mary Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom—A Second-Class Right?, 61 EMORY L.J. 971
(2012).
29 For a good, recent sample of arguments pro and con, see LEGAL RESPONSES TO
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS (Austin Sarat
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century founding era—and that is now sharply contested, too—it has become
obsolete in our post-establishment, postmodern, and post-religious age.
Religion, these critics argue, is too dangerous, divisive, and diverse in its
demands to be accorded special protection.30  Freedom of conscience claim-
ants unfairly demand the right to be a law unto themselves, to the detriment
of general laws and to the endangerment of other people’s fundamental
rights and legitimate interests.  Institutional religious autonomy is too often
just a special cover for abuses of power and forms of prejudice that should
not be countenanced in any organization—religious or not.  Religious liberty
claims are too often proxies for political or social agendas that deserve no
more protection than any other agenda.  Religion, these critics thus con-
clude, should be viewed as just another category of liberty or association, with
no more preference or privilege than its secular counterparts.  Religion
should be treated as just another form of expression, subject to the same
rules of rational democratic deliberation that govern other ideas and values.
To accord religion any special protection or exemption discriminates against
the nonreligious.  To afford religion a special seat at the table of public delib-
eration or a special role in the implementation of government programs
invites religious self-dealing contrary to the First Amendment Establishment
Clause.  We cannot afford these traditional constitutional luxuries.  “The per-
ils of extreme religious liberty” are now upon us.31
University of Chicago law professor Brian Leiter is a leading exponent of
such critical views of religious freedom.  In his widely read title, Why Tolerate
Religion? (2013), this distinguished legal philosopher, with expertise in the
iconoclast views of Friedrich Nietzsche, launches an iconoclastic attack on
religious freedom—especially the notion that religious practitioners some-
times deserve exemptions from general laws that are not available to nonreli-
gious citizens.  Leiter argues that “there is no apparent moral reason why
states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to
ed., 2012) [hereinafter LEGAL RESPONSES]; THE RISE, supra note 26, at 231–55; Steven D.
Smith & Larry Alexander, Introduction to the Symposium, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 971 (2014).
For overviews of this recent academic literature, and arguments for a realistic middle way,
see KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING
RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIG-
IOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).
30 See e.g., LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 29; BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 63
(2013); Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, supra note 26; Micah Schwartzman,
What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); Smith & Alexander, supra
note 29.
31 MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(2d rev. ed. 2014); for other recent examples see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE
G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007); Martin S. Lederman, Recon-
structing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 416,
419–21 (2016); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); James W. Nickel, Who Needs
Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941 (2005); Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommo-
dation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 24 (2014).
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structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the
standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute
constraints on judgment and action.”32  Government must be studiously neu-
tral in its devotion to “principled” toleration; it is “unfair,” “arbitrar[y],”
impractical, and even “anarch[ic]” to give special accommodations, exemp-
tions, immunities, or protections to religion or to religious claims of con-
science.33  Doing so would be “a morally objectionable injury to the general
welfare” and would “impose burdens on those who have no claim of exemp-
tion.”34  Indeed, Leiter muses whether there may be “reason to worry that
religious beliefs, as against other matters of conscience, are far more likely to
cause harms and infringe on liberty?”35  Consider religion’s track record of
late in abridging the fundamental rights of others to reproductive freedom,
marital equality, or sexual liberty.  Or consider that “religious believers over-
whelmingly supported George W. Bush, widely considered one of the worst
presidents in the history of the United States, whom many think ought to be
held morally culpable both for the illegal war of aggression against Iraq as
well as the casualties resulting from domestic mismanagement.”36  This
might well provide “the basis of an argument for why there are special rea-
sons not to tolerate religion” at all—although, Leiter allows, that would
require empirical proof that religion, on balance, does more harm than
good.37
University of Virginia law professor Micah Schwartzman has similarly
attracted attention with a series of sharp law review attacks on religious
exemptions and religious institutionalism.38  He argues that America has
now come to embrace a great “diversity of nontheistic religious, ethical, and
moral doctrines” from which religion “cannot easily be distinguished . . . on
epistemic or psychological grounds.”39  Religious claims of conscience, he
writes, have no more right to accommodations or exemptions than any other
“comprehensive secular doctrine,” and for the state to give them such would
be patently “unfair” and unwieldy and yield “inconsistenc[y]” in the applica-
32 LEITER, supra note 30, at 63.
33 Id. at 94, 102.
34 Id. at 99.
35 Id. at 59.
36 Id. at 83.
37 Id. at 59, 84. But see Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE
L.J. 770 (2013); Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions—Whether Religion Is Special
or Not, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1395 (2014).
38 See, inter alia, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institution-
alism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013); Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in
Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15 (2013);
Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085 (2014); Schwartz-
man, supra note 30.  For rejoinders, see Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations,
and Why Religion Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24 (2013); Andrew Kop-
pelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71 (2013).
39 Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 1426.
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tion and enforcement of general laws.40  Moreover, free exercise religious
exemptions cannot be viewed as a constitutional counterweight to the Estab-
lishment Clause limit on governmental support for religion.  Whatever the
courts make of the Establishment Clause, the very notion that “religious con-
victions can serve as sufficient reasons for state action . . . is one that we
should reject as a threat to the very foundations of our constitutional order”
in a pluralistic liberal democracy.41  Finally, Professor Schwartzman (with co-
author and colleague Richard Schragger) argues that the notion that relig-
ious groups have special corporate autonomy is a quaint species of “neo-
medieval” nostalgia about the “two kingdoms” of church and state and a dan-
gerous form of “corporatist” pluralism that would afford free-handed “sover-
eignty” to other institutions besides the state.42  The reality is that a religious
institution enjoys no more power, rights, or autonomy than the individuals
who make it up.  A religious group has no more basis for encroaching on
other people’s rights or freedoms than any one member of that religious
group might have.  All this, Schwartzman concludes, might be “morally
regrettable” and cause “intellectual ache” to religious freedom advocates, but
that’s just how it is in our postmodern day.  Religious freedom had its special
time.43  That time has passed.
There is much more to Professor Leiter’s and Schwartzman’s arguments
than this, of course, and there are many more such critical arguments on
religious freedom now crowding the law review pages and library book-
shelves.44  But this sampling gives a little flavor of critical academic opinion
today.  Religious liberty is increasingly viewed as an impediment to progress,
not a bulwark of democracy; as a shield for bigotry, not a haven for the
unpopular; as a threat to liberalism, not a foundation of liberty.  Leading
religious freedom scholars like Michael McConnell,45 Douglas Laycock,46
Kent Greenawalt,47 Andrew Koppelman,48 Richard Garnett,49 Thomas
40 Id. at 1377, 1424, 1426.
41 Id. at 1426–27.
42 Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 38, at 922,
930.
43 Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 1351–52, 1414 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1306 (1983));
see also Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 38.
44 See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013); Ira C.
Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GEN-
DER 35 (2014).
45 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 37.
46 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active R
Minority Groups: A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 369 (2016).
47 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections
on Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131 (2010); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration
and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91 (2013).
48 See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 38; Andrew Koppelman, “Religion” as a Bundle of
Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1079 (2014); KOPPELMAN,
supra note 29.
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Berg,50 and several others have parried these attacks.  But after reading all
this internecine law review squabbling, Stanley Fish—no stranger to strong
debates about fundamental matters—dismissed it all as “a dispiriting record
of hairsplittings, pendulum swings, ad hoc acrobatics, systematic distortions,
strained redefinitions, and just plain logical howlers.  What we have, in short,
is the ongoing spectacle, bordering on farce, that is religion clause
jurisprudence.”51
III. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICISMS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
We have not joined these law review debates to date, and we dip into
them here with some hesitation since analysis and exposition have been our
chosen methods of scholarship, not polemics and disputation.  But religious
liberty is too precious and hard-won a foundation and feature of modern
democratic life to allow all these critical assaults to go by without comment
on some of their fundamental weaknesses.  “Come now let us reason
together,” says the ancient Prophet Isaiah—an admonition as important for
community life today as it was in that ancient time.52
Too many of these critical arguments trade in revisionist history that pre-
tends that the American founders cared rather little about religious freedom,
that the First Amendment was only an “afterthought” and “foreordained” to
fail,53 or that principles like separation of church and state were really
designed to protect Protestant hegemonies against surging Catholicism.54
49 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Neutrality and the Good of Religious Freedom: An Apprecia-
tive Response to Professor Koppelman, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1149 (2013); Richard W. Garnett, The
Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011); Richard
W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration,
and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493 (2015).
50 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 38; Thomas C. Berg, Progressive Arguments for Religious Orga-
nizational Freedom: Reflections on the HHS Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 280
(2013).
51 Stanley Fish, Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2014).
52 Isaiah 1:18.
53 STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 48–75
(2014); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIN-
CIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1999).
54 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2004); DAVID SEHAT, THE
MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2011); see John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of
Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003) (reviewing Hamburger).  In addition, see the
historical claims of HAMILTON, supra note 31, which prompted a blistering review by Doug-
las Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169 (2007).  And more generally, see
the new critical historiography of human rights by Samuel Moyn, who argues that the inter-
national religious freedom norms and other human rights that emerged in the mid-twenti-
eth century were the product of a conservative Christian movement, driven by aggressive
and theologically-infused personalist philosophies of human dignity designed to protect
the interests of the church and the hegemony of Christianity. SAMUEL MOYN, CHRISTIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS (2015).  For a critical review, see John Witte, Jr., The Long History of Human
Rights, BOOKS & CULTURE, Mar.–Apr. 2016, http://www.booksandculture.com/articles/
2016/marapr/long-history-of-human-rights.html; see also ALLEN D. HERTZKE, FREEING
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The historical reality is that the founding generation spent a great deal of
time debating and defending religious freedom for all peaceable faiths, and
wove multiple principles of religious freedom into the new state and federal
constitutions of 1776 to 1791: notably, the principles of liberty of conscience,
free exercise of religion, religious pluralism, religious equality, separation of
church and state, and disestablishment of religion.55  Yes, sadly, some later
Protestant majorities did abuse Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Native Americans,
and too many others.56  But these were violations of constitutional freedom
norms, not manifestations of their prejudicial designs—as some nineteenth-
century cases and many more twentieth-century constitutional cases made
abundantly clear.
Too many of these critical arguments trade in philosophical abstractions
that hover too high above the hard and quotidian legal questions that have
occupied the Supreme Court in its 230 cases on religious freedom, let alone
the many thousands of lower federal and state court cases on point.  Aca-
demic reflections on the appropriate forms and scope of religious liberty, of
course, are not bound by what courts have said, nor compelled to follow all
the silly casuistry that plagues parts of the First Amendment caselaw.  But
legal theories of religious freedom should at least deal concretely with the
laws of religious freedom on the books and in action, offering reforms and
improvements on how to apply them.57
Professor Schwartzman, for example, spills a great deal of ink building
up elaborate theoretical constructs—of “inclusive accommodation, exclusive
accommodation, exclusive nonaccommodation, and inclusive nonaccom-
modation”—only to shoot them all down as part of his broader assault on
religious freedom gone wild.58  But nowhere does he acknowledge that relig-
ious freedom accommodations have been part of American law from its colo-
nial beginnings—think of religious oath requirements, military conscription
laws, or property tax laws that have always included exemptions.  Nor does he
acknowledge that religious accommodations have not proved to be the
unworkable, unwieldy, or (as Leiter puts it) “anarchic” undermining of gen-
GOD’S CHILDREN: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE FOR GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2004); DAVID LIT-
TLE, ESSAYS ON RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUND TO STAND ON 57–82, 170–76 (2015);
Joel A. Nichols, Evangelicals and Human Rights: The Continuing Ambivalence of Evangelical
Christians’ Support for Human Rights, 24 J.L. & REL. 629 (2009).
55 Joel A. Nichols & John Witte, Jr., National Report [for the] United States of America:
Religious Law and Religious Courts as a Challenge to the State, in RELIGIOUS LAW AND RELIGIOUS
COURTS AS A CHALLENGE TO THE STATE: LEGAL PLURALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 83
(Uwe Kischel ed., 2016); WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 41–63.
56 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 64–116; NO ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION:
AMERICA’S ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (T. Jeremy Gunn & John Witte,
Jr. eds., 2012).
57 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profes-
sion, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
58 Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 1358.
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eral laws that they are described to be.59  Must we dispense with all of the
historic religious accommodations?  Is the law of religious accommodations
or exemptions any harder to administer than any other complex law in
action?  Would Professor Schwartzman forbid the legislature or the judiciary
from creating new accommodations?  On what constitutional grounds?
Nowhere does he acknowledge that free exercise rights or legislative accom-
modations do not protect religious activities that put others at serious risk of
harm or violate others’ fundamental rights.  Religious exemptions create
spaces for believers to exercise their faiths peacefully, not licenses to do harm
to their neighbors or to the common good.  Even Hobby Lobby, the poster case
for “extreme religious freedom,” went to great lengths to insist that the com-
pany owners’ conscientious objections to paying for certain forms of birth
control health insurance coverage did not and could not negate a woman’s
right to contraceptives.60  The issue in the case is who pays for the contracep-
tives, not whether a woman has a right to them.61  And nowhere does Profes-
sor Schwartzman’s attack on religious institutionalism address the legal
reality that all manner of institutions—corporations, labor unions, universi-
ties, charities, libraries, hospitals, and many others—exercise power and
responsibility, and enjoy rights and liberties beyond what any individual
member of that group can muster on his or her own.62  Surely he cannot
want us to go back to simple Lockean social contract theories of legal groups
as mere voluntary assemblies of like-minded individuals.  Nor can he want us
to revisit questions about corporate identity and rights that have been settled
in the United States since Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)63
and its many progeny.  If the status of group rights is not up for grabs, why
should the legal status of religious groups be up for grabs?64  The Western
legal tradition has recognized religious group rights at least since the Edict of
59 See Koppelman, supra note 38, at 71–83; Rienzi, supra note 37, at 1410–14; see also
Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163
(2016).
60 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
61 For an interesting analysis, see RAVITCH, supra note 22.
62 See also Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049
(2013), with fuller treatment in PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013);
Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and
Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013).
63 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
64 But cf. Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277,
280 (2015) (disagreeing with Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2767, and asserting that “there is no
principled basis for corporate religious liberty”). Contra Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman,
Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA
Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014); Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby
Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777 (2015) (discussing how the Hobby Lobby opinion squares well
with corporate social responsibility and the notion that corporations can and sometimes do
pursue goals other than maximizing shareholder profits); see also RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 139 (2015).
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Milan in 313.65  And today every major international human rights instru-
ment on religion and every liberal democracy in Europe does so, too66—
even those with professed national policies of “secularism.”67  Why should
American law now be different?
Too many of these critical arguments trade in outmoded philosophical
assumptions that serious public and political arguments about the fundamen-
tals of life and the law can take place under the “factitious or fictitious scrim
of value neutrality.”68  The reality, the last generation of philosophy has
taught us, is that every serious position on the fundamental values governing
public and private life—on warfare, marriage reform, bioethics, environmen-
tal protection, and much more—rests on a set of founding metaphors and
starting beliefs that have comparable faith-like qualities.69  Liberalism and
secularism are just two belief systems among many, and their public policies
and prescriptions are enlightened, improved, and strengthened by full public
engagement with other serious forms of faith, belief, and values.  Today, easy
claims of rational neutrality and objectivity in public and political arguments
face very strong epistemological headwinds.  Even the leading architects of
religion-free public reason a generation or two ago have abandoned these
views.  John Rawls and Ju¨rgen Habermas, for example, have affirmed in their
later writings that religion can play valuable and legitimate roles in the law-
making processes of liberal democracies.70  A growing number of serious
political thinkers now acknowledge that deeply held beliefs and values,
whether they issue from secular or religious sources, are not easily bracketed
in public discourse; that efforts to exclude an entire class of moral and meta-
physical knowledge are more likely to yield mutual distrust and hostility than
social accord; that free speech norms do not allow the prohibition of religion
from the public square; and that avowedly secular values are not inherently
more objective than their religious counterparts.71  Secular norms and idi-
oms can serve as useful discursive resources in religiously pluralistic societies.
But purging religion altogether from public life and political deliberation, as
65 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 10; LACTANTIUS, DE MORTIBUS PERSECUTORUM
71–73 (J.L. Creed trans. & ed., 1984).
66 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 249–75.
67 Id. at 259–65; Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in
Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 78 (2002).  More recently, see IRA C. LUPU &
ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 41–112 (2014).
68 LENN E. GOODMAN, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND VALUES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 101
(2014).  This paragraph is adapted from Justin Latterell & John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion,
and Reason in a Constitutional Democracy: Goodman v. Rawls, 16 POL. THEOLOGY 543, 546
(2015).
69 JOHN PERRY, THE PRETENSES OF LOYALTY: LOCKE, LIBERAL THEORY, AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEOLOGY (2011); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND
MIND (2001).
70 See, e.g., Ju¨rgen Habermas, An Awareness of What Is Missing, in AN AWARENESS OF
WHAT IS MISSING: FAITH AND REASON IN A POST-SECULAR AGE 15 (Ciaran Cronin trans.,
2010); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
71 Habermas, supra note 70; Rawls, supra note 70.
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some aggressive interpreters of the Establishment Clause demand, is imprac-
tical, shortsighted, and unjust.
Too many of these critical arguments against religious liberty trade in
caricatures of religion that bear little resemblance to reality.  Professor
Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion?, for example, treats religion as an irrational
opiate of the masses.  Religion, he writes, by definition consists of categorical
beliefs that “are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational
justification, the ones we employ in both common sense and in science.”72
Religions place “categorical demands on action . . . that must be satisfied no
matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and no matter what incentives
or disincentives the world offers up.”73  And religion provides mainly “exis-
tential consolation” about “the basic existential facts about human life, such
as suffering and death.”74  Why should a claim or claimant that is so irra-
tional, unscientific, categorical, abstract, and impervious to empirical evi-
dence or common sense get special constitutional treatment, Professor Leiter
asks?  Just because religion provides existential consolation?  Many other
nonreligious things do, too.  Just because religion leads some people to do
good to others?  People do good for all kinds of nonreligious reasons, too,
and plenty of religious folks also do very bad things.  There’s nothing to relig-
ion that makes it more special or more deserving of constitutional protection
than other types of thought or action, Professor Leiter concludes.  If any-
thing, because religion is irrational and categorical, it should be subject to
special supervision, not special accommodation.75
Few people of faith, and even fewer scholars of religion, would recognize
this caricature of religion.  For many adherents, religion consists of complex
and comprehensive “life-worlds” (as anthropologists call them).  Religion
involves daily rites and practices, patterns of social life and culture, and insti-
tutional structures and activities that collectively involve almost every dimen-
sion of an individual’s public and private life.  Professor Leiter and many
other critics of religious freedom posit a flat and anachronistic concept of
“religion” as mere irrational belief and self-interested truth claims.  And even
then, they pay little attention to the immense literature on philosophy of
religion and religious epistemology, hermeneutics, theological ethics, and
more, which has placed religious ideas and beliefs, metaphors and norms,
and canons and commandments into complex and edifying conversations
with nonreligious premises and worldviews.  It is this diverse and often
sophisticated world of religious ideas and institutions, norms and practices,
and cultures and communities whose freedom is at stake, not the imagined
religious abstractions that haunt the law review world.76
72 LEITER, supra note 30, at 34.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 52 (emphasis omitted).
75 See id. at 59–64, 73–85.
76 For further discussion, see Christopher J. Eberle, Religion and Insularity: Brian Leiter
on Accommodating Religion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 977 (2014); McConnell, supra note 37, at
782–89; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1043
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Too many of these critical arguments trade in one-sided sociologies that
dwell on the negatives rather than the positives of religion.  It is undeniable
that religion has been, and still is, a formidable force for both political good
and political evil, that it has fostered both benevolence and belligerence, and
both peace and pathos of untold dimensions.  But when religious officials or
religious group members do commit crimes—embezzling funds, perpetrat-
ing fraud, evading regulations, withholding medical care, betraying trust,
raping children, abusing spouses, fomenting violence, harming the life and
limb of anyone, including their own members—they are and should be pros-
ecuted just like everyone else.  Religious freedom does not and should not
provide protections or pretexts for crime.  But the grim reality is that these
crimes occur in every organization, and are perpetrated by all manner of
people, religious and nonreligious alike.  That these abuses must be rooted
out, however, does not mean that the perpetrator’s individual or corporate
rights must end as a consequence.  Governments do not close down schools,
libraries, clubs, charities, or corporations when a few of their members com-
mit these crimes.  They prosecute the criminals, following the norms of due
process.  The same should take place in our churches, synagogues, temples,
and mosques that harbor criminal suspects.
Moreover, we would do well to remember the immensely valuable goods
that religion offers to a community.  America’s leading religious historian,
Martin E. Marty, has documented the private and public goods of religion
over a sixty-year career.  Religions, he shows, deal uniquely with the deepest
elements of individual and social life.  Religions catalyze social, intellectual,
and material exchanges among citizens.  Religions trigger economic, charita-
ble, and educational impulses in citizens.  Religions provide valuable checks
and counterpoints to social and individual excess.  Religions help diffuse
social and political crises and absolutisms by relativizing everyday life and its
institutions.  Religions provide prophecy, criticism, and exemplars for soci-
ety.  Religions force others to examine their presuppositions.  Religions are
distinct repositories of tradition, wisdom, and perspective.  Religions counsel
against apathy.  Religions often represent practiced and durable sources and
forms of community.  Religions provide leadership and hope, especially in
times of individual and social crisis.  Religions contribute to the theory and
practice of the common good.  Religions represent the unrepresented, teach
stewardship and preservation, provide fresh starts for the desperate, and exalt
the dignity and freedom of the individual.77  No religion lives up to all these
claims all the time; some religions never do.  But these common qualities and
(2014); see also generally CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN LIBERAL POLIT-
ICS (2002).
77 See MARTIN E. MARTY & JONATHAN MOORE, POLITICS, RELIGION, AND THE COMMON
GOOD: ADVANCING A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN CONVERSATION ABOUT RELIGION’S ROLE IN OUR
SHARED LIFE (2000).
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contributions have long been among the reasons to support the special place
of religion in the American constitutional and cultural order.78
Finally, too many of these critical arguments fail to appreciate how
dearly fought religious freedom has been in the history of humankind, how
imperiled religious freedom has become in many parts of the world today,
and how indispensable religious freedom has proved to be for the protection
of other fundamental human rights in modern democracies.79  Even in
postmodern liberal societies, religions help to define the meanings and mea-
sures of shame and regret, restraint and respect, and responsibility and resti-
tution that a human rights regime presupposes.  Religions help to lay out the
fundamentals of human dignity and human community, and the essentials of
human nature and human needs upon which human rights norms and
instruments are built.  Moreover, religions stand alongside the state and
other institutions in helping to implement and protect the rights of a person
and community—especially at times when the state becomes weak, dis-
tracted, divided, cash-strapped, corrupt, or is in transition.  Religious commu-
nities can create the conditions (sometimes the prototypes) for the
realization of civil and political rights of speech, press, assembly, and more.
They can provide a critical (sometimes the principal) means of education,
healthcare, childcare, labor organizations, employment, and artistic opportu-
nities, among other things.  And they can offer some of the deepest insights
into the duties of stewardship and service that lie at the heart of environmen-
tal rights and protection.
Because of the vital role of religion in the cultivation and implementa-
tion of other human rights, many social scientists and human rights scholars
have come to see that providing strong protections for religious beliefs, prac-
tices, and institutions enhances, rather than diminishes, human rights for
all.80  Many scholars now repeat the American founders’ insight that relig-
ious freedom is “the first freedom” from which other rights and freedoms
evolve.81  For the religious individual, the right to believe often correlates
with freedoms to assemble, speak, worship, evangelize, educate, parent,
78 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 29, at 120–65 (offering a jurisprudential exposition of
the goods of religion).
79 See BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSE-
CUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011); Daniel Philpott, In Defense of
Religious Freedom, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 31
J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2016).
80 See, e.g., Thomas F. Farr, Diplomacy in an Age of Faith: Religious Freedom and National
Security, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 110, 111 (2008) (“Social science data show strong correlations
between religious freedom and social, economic, and political goods.”); Nathan R. Todd,
Religious Networking Organizations and Social Justice: An Ethnographic Case Study, 50 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 229 (2012).
81 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1243 (2000); cf. Peter Manseau, Is Religious Freedom Really Primary?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 2012), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/is-religious-free-
dom-really-primary (illustrating how the concept of religious freedom as the first freedom
is a bipartisan belief among presidential candidates going back decades, and noting that
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travel, or to abstain from the same on the basis of one’s beliefs.  For the
religious association, the right to practice religion collectively implicates
rights to corporate property, collective worship, organized charity, religious
education, freedom of press, and autonomy of governance.  Several detailed
studies have shown that the protection of “religious freedom in a country is
strongly associated with other freedoms, including civil and political liberty,
press freedom, and economic freedom, as well as with multiple measures of
well-being”—less warfare and violence, better healthcare, higher levels of
income, and better educational and social opportunities, especially for
women, children, the disabled, and the poor.82
By contrast, where religious freedom is low, communities tend to suffer
and struggle.  A comprehensive 2009 study, updated in 2016, documented
that more than a third of the world’s 198 countries and self-administering
territories had “high” or “very high” levels of religious oppression, sometimes
exacerbated by civil wars, natural disasters, and foreign invasions that have
caused massive humanitarian crises.  The countries on this dishonor roll
include Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Burma, Rwanda,
Burundi, Congo, Chechnya, and Uzbekistan, among others.83  A recent
annual report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
confirms the precarious status of religious minorities in many parts of the
world, now exacerbated by the rise of ISIS in the Middle East and the escalat-
ing oppression of Muslim and Christian minorities in various parts of the
world.84  A 2014 study found that Christians, in fact, were more widely
harassed than any other religious group, experiencing social and political
hostility in at least 110 countries.85  These hostilities against religious believ-
ers are carried out by a wide range of private groups and governmental enti-
ties.  They include arrests and detentions; desecration of holy sites, books,
“[t]he suggestion that religious liberty is the nation’s ‘first freedom’ has become so com-
monplace that it seems churlish to question it”).
82 Brian J. Grim, Restrictions on Religion in the World: Measures and Implications, in THE
FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GLOBAL CHALLENGES 86, 101 (Allen D. Hertzke ed., 2013).
83 See 1–2 CHRISTIANITY AND FREEDOM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
(Timothy Samuel Shah & Allen D. Hertzke eds., 2016); PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB.
LIFE, GLOBAL RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION 12 (2009), http://www.pewforum.org/files/
2009/12/restrictions-fullreport1.pdf. But see PEW RES. CTR., TRENDS IN GLOBAL RESTRIC-
TIONS ON RELIGION (2016), http://www.pewforum.org/2016/06/23/trends-in-global-re
strictions-on-religion/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=400ec7484e-
Religion_weekly_June_23_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-400ec7
484e-399936457 (showing, in the most recent Pew poll, a decline in religious restrictions
and hostilities).
84 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 2014, 15TH ANNIVERSARY RET-
ROSPECTIVE: RENEWING THE COMMITMENT (2014).
85 PEW RES. CTR., RELIGIOUS HOSTILITIES REACH SIX-YEAR HIGH 21 (2014), http://www
.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/RestrictionsV-full-report.pdf.  By comparison, Muslims were
harassed in 109 countries; Jews in 71 countries; “others” (e.g., Sikhs, Zoroastrians, Baha’i,
etc.) in 40 countries; “folk religionists” in 26 countries; Hindus in 16 countries; and Bud-
dhists in 13 countries. Id.
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and objects; denial of visas, corporate charters, and entity status; discrimina-
tion in employment, education, and housing; closures of worship centers,
schools, charities, cemeteries, and religious services; and worse: rape, torture,
kidnappings, beheadings, and the genocidal slaughter of religious believers
in alarming numbers in war-torn areas of the Middle East and Africa.86  In
light of these grim global realities, those who argue that American religious
freedom is a dispensable cultural luxury would do well to direct their formi-
dable talents to more constructive agendas.
IV. RESTORING AMERICA’S ENDURING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PRINCIPLES
So, where do we go from here?  We suggest looking back to the wisdom
of the American founders and using their enduring insights to appreciate
what it is at stake in the modern culture wars over religious freedom, at home
and abroad.
Let’s let John Adams, Massachusetts jurist, constitutional framer, and
future American president be our guide in the brief look backward.  Writing
in the context of the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787,
Adams offered a robust appraisal of the new American experiment:
The people in America have now the best opportunity and the greatest trust
in their hands, that Providence ever committed to so small a number, since
the transgression of the first pair [Adam and Eve]; if they betray their trust,
their guilt will merit even greater punishment than other nations have suf-
fered, and the indignation of Heaven. . . .
. . . .
The United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first example
of governments erected on the simple principles of nature; and if men are
now sufficiently enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, imposture,
hypocrisy, and superstition, they will consider this event as [a new] era in
their history.  Although the detail of the formation of the American govern-
ments is at present little known or regarded either in Europe or in America,
it may hereafter become an object of curiosity. . . . [For it is] destined to
spread over the northern part of . . . the globe . . . .
. . . .
The institutions now made in America will not wholly wear out for
thousands of years.  It is of the last importance, then, that they should begin
right.  If they set out wrong, they will never be able to return, unless it be by
accident, to the right path.87
86 See id.; see also W. Cole Durham, Jr. et al., The Status of and Threats to International Law
on Freedom of Religion or Belief, in THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GLOBAL CHALLENGES,
supra note 82, at 31.
87 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 290, 292–93, 298 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851)
[hereinafter WORKS] (footnote omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 173 (James
Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (writing of the formation of the Constitution that “[i]t
is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it, a finger of that Almighty
hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages
of the revolution”).
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More than two centuries later, Adams’s sentiments prove remarkably
prescient.  For all of their failures and shortcomings, the eighteenth-century
founders did indeed begin on the right “path” toward a free society, and
today, Americans enjoy a good deal of religious, civil, and political freedom
as a consequence.  American principles of religious freedom have had a
profound influence around the globe, and they now figure prominently in a
number of national constitutions and international human rights instru-
ments issued by political and religious bodies.88
To be sure, as Adams predicted, there has always been a “glorious uncer-
tainty of the law” of religious liberty and a noble diversity of understandings
of its details.89  This was as true in Adams’s day as in our own.  In Adams’s
day, there were competing models of religious liberty that were more overtly
theological than his—whether Puritan, Evangelical, Catholic, Quaker, or
Anglican in inspiration.  There were also competing models that were more
overtly philosophical than his—whether Neoclassical, Republican, Whig, or
Liberal in inclination.90  Today, these and other founding models of relig-
ious liberty have born ample progeny, and the great rivalries among them are
fought out in the courts, legislatures, and academies throughout the land
and, increasingly, the world.
Prone as he was to a dialectical model of religious liberty, Adams would
likely approve of our rigorous rivalries of principle—so long as the rivals
themselves remain committed to constitutional ideals of democratic order,
rule of law, and ordered liberty for all.  But Adams would also likely insist that
we reconsider his most cardinal insights about the necessary dialectical
nature of religious freedom and religious establishment.  Too little religious
freedom, Adams insisted, is a recipe for hypocrisy and impiety.  But too
unbridled religious freedom is an invitation to license and criminality.  Too
firm a religious establishment breeds coercion and corruption.  But too little
concern for religion allows anti-religious prejudices to become constitutional
prerogatives.  Somewhere between these extremes, Adams believed, a society
must find its balance.91
One key to re-striking this constitutional balance today lies in the eight-
eenth-century founders’ most elementary insight—that religion is special and
needs special protection in the Constitution.  “[W]e cannot repudiate that
decision without rejecting an essential feature of constitutionalism, render-
ing all constitutional rights vulnerable to repudiation if they go out of favor,”
writes Douglas Laycock.92  Although America’s religious landscape has
88 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 250–55.
89 Letter from John Adams to Josiah Quincy (Feb. 9, 1811), in 9 WORKS, supra note 87,
at 630.
90 WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 24–40.
91 See John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion”: John Adams
and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213, 216 (1999).
92 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314
(1996); see also generally 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY
(2010); 2 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE (2011).
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changed, religion remains today a unique source of individual and personal
identity for many, involving “the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it,” in James Madison’s words.93  The founders’ vision
was that religion is more than simply another form of speech and assembly,
privacy and autonomy; it deserves separate constitutional treatment.  The
founders thus placed freedom of religion alongside freedoms of speech, press,
and assembly, giving religious claimants special protection and restricting
government in its interaction with religion.  Religion is also a unique form of
public and social identity, involving a vast plurality of sanctuaries, schools,
charities, missions, and other forms and forums of faith.  All peaceable exer-
cises of religion, whether individual or corporate, private or public, properly
deserve the protection of the First Amendment.  And such protection some-
times requires special exemptions and accommodations that cannot be
afforded by general laws.94  “The tyranny of the majority,” Madison reminds
us, is particularly dangerous to religious minorities.95
A second key to re-striking this constitutional balance lies in the eight-
eenth-century founders’ insight that to be enduring and effective, the consti-
tutional process must seek to involve all voices and values in the
community—religious, nonreligious, and anti-religious alike.  Healthy consti-
tutionalism ultimately demands “confident pluralism”96—in John Inazu’s apt
phrase.  Thus in creating the new American constitutions, the framers drew
upon all manner of representatives and voters to create and ratify these new
organic laws.  Believers and skeptics, churchmen and statesmen, Protestants
and Catholics, Quakers and Jews, Civic Republicans and Enlightenment Lib-
erals—many of whom had slandered if not slaughtered each other with a
vengeance in years past—now came together in a rare moment of constitu-
tional solidarity.  The founders understood that a proper law of religious lib-
erty required that all peaceable religions and believers participate in both its
creation and its unfolding.  To be sure, both in the founders’ day and in
subsequent generations, some Americans showed little concern for the relig-
ious or civil rights of Jews, Catholics, Mormons, Native Americans, Asian
Americans, or African Americans, and too often inflicted horrible abuses
upon them.  And today, some of these old prejudices are returning anew in
bitter clashes over race, immigration, and refugees, and in fresh outbreaks of
nativism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.  But a generous willingness to
embrace all peaceable religions in the great project of religious freedom is
one of the most original and compelling insights of the American experi-
93 James Madison, Article on Religion Adopted by Convention (June 12, 1776), in 1
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 175 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
1962).
94 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 99–101 (regarding the meaning of liberty of
conscience in the founding era).
95 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
96 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP DIF-
FERENCE (2016).
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ment.  As John Adams put it, religious freedom “resides in Hindoos and
Mahometans, as well as in Christians; in Cappadocian monarchists, as well as
in Athenian democrats; in Shaking Quakers, as well as in . . . Presbyterian
clergy; in Tartars and Arabs, Negroes and Indians”—indeed in “[all] the peo-
ple of the United States.”97
A third key to re-striking this constitutional balance lies in balancing the
multiple principles of religious liberty that the founders set forth in the fru-
gal, sixteen-word phrase, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”98  The founders
designed the First Amendment religion clauses as twin guarantees of relig-
ious liberty for all.  The Free Exercise Clause outlaws government proscriptions
of religion—actions that unduly burden the conscience, restrict religious
expression and activity, discriminate against religion, or invade the autonomy
of churches and other religious bodies.  The Establishment Clause outlaws
government prescriptions of religion—actions that unduly coerce the con-
science, mandate forms of religious expression and activity, discriminate in
favor of religion, or improperly ally the state with churches or other religious
bodies.  The First Amendment guarantees of no establishment and free exer-
cise of religion thereby provide complementary protections to the other con-
stitutive principles of the American experiment—liberty of conscience,
religious equality, religious pluralism, and separation of church and state.99
These three insights were not only part of the original vision of the
eighteenth-century founders; they were also part of the original vision of the
Supreme Court as it created the modern constitutional law of religious free-
dom.  All three of these insights recur in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)100 and
in Everson v. Board of Education (1947),101 the two landmark cases that first
applied the First Amendment religion clauses to the states and inaugurated
the modern era of religious liberty in America.
Cantwell and Everson declared anew that religion had a special place in
the Constitution and deserved special protection in the nation.  In a remark-
able counter-textual reading, the Court took it upon itself and the federal
judiciary to enforce the First Amendment religion clauses against all levels
and branches of government in the nation.  By incorporating the First
Amendment religion clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, the Court created a common and special law of religious liberty for
the whole nation.  “Congress shall make no law” now became, in effect, “Gov-
ernment shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof.”
97 Letter from John Adams to John Taylor (Apr. 15, 1814), in 6 WORKS, supra note 87,
at 474; see also Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (June 28, 1813), in 2 THE
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 339–40 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99 Nichols & Witte, supra note 55, at 92–94.
100 310 U.S. 296, 303–04, 310 (1940).
101 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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Cantwell and Everson also declared anew that all religious voices were
welcome in the modern constitutional process of protecting religious liberty.
These two cases welcomed hitherto marginal voices: Cantwell welcomed a
devout Jehovah’s Witness who sought protections for his very unpopular mis-
sionary work. Everson welcomed a skeptical citizen who sought protection
from paying taxes in support of religious education.  Subsequent cases have
drawn into the constitutional dialogue a host of other religious and anti-relig-
ious groups—Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox Christians; Jews, Muslims,
and Hindus; Mormons, Quakers, and Hare Krishnas; Wiccans, Santerians,
and Summumites; Skeptics, Atheists, and Secularists.
And Cantwell and Everson declared anew the efficacy of the founding
principles of the American experiment in religious freedom.  The Free Exer-
cise Clause, the Cantwell Court proclaimed, protects “[f]reedom of con-
science and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose.”102  It “safeguards the free exercise of
the chosen form of religion,” the “freedom to act” on one’s beliefs.103  It
protects a plurality of forms and expressions of faith, each of which deserves
equal protection under the law.  “The essential characteristic of these liber-
ties is, that under their shield many types of life, character, opinion and
belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.”104  The Establishment
Clause, the Everson Court echoed, means that no government “can set up a
church”; “can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion”; can “punish[ ] [a person] for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance”; “can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa.”105  Government may not “exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of
it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation” or participating
in the American public arena or political process.106  Such was the original
vision of the founders in the eighteenth century and of the Supreme Court at
the start of the modern era of religious liberty in the 1940s.107
We need another landmark case or two to retrieve and reanimate these
fundamental principles of religious freedom.  The weakening of the First
Amendment religion clauses in Supreme Court cases since the mid-1980s has
102 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 310.
105 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16.
106 Id. at 16.
107 For other insightful renderings of the multiple principles or values of the First
Amendment religion clauses, see for example JESSE CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); 1 KENT GREENA-
WALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FAIRNESS AND FREE EXERCISE (2006); 2 KENT GREEN-
AWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008); STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-1\NDL109.txt unknown Seq: 22 30-NOV-16 11:18
448 notre dame law review [vol. 92:1
placed too much discretionary power in the hands of the legislature and the
states.  Such a shift leaves what should be common national rights of religious
liberty too vulnerable to fleeting political fashions and too contingent on a
claimant’s geographical location.  The federal courts should provide com-
mon and firm religious liberty protections for all parties, no matter where
those parties happen to reside or where they choose to file their lawsuits.
This need for a strong common national law on religious liberty, in the face
of grim bigotry at home and religious persecution abroad, was among the
compelling reasons that led the Supreme Court in the 1940s to “incorporate”
the First Amendment religion clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause and make them binding on state and local governments.108  It
was also the reason that America and the world embraced religious freedom
in the 1940s as a universal and non-derogable human right—one of the
famous “four freedoms” that President Roosevelt championed to rebuke the
horrific abuses inflicted on Jews and others during World War II.109  This
vision of a strong federal constitutional law of religious liberty remains essen-
tial for America, and the federal courts are still in the best position to enforce
this law.  Strong new statutes protecting religious freedom are welcome addi-
tions, but strong constitutional norms, enforced by the federal courts, are an
essential core of American religious liberty.
Constitutions work like “clock[s],” John Adams reminds us.  Certain
parts of them are “essentials and fundamentals,” and, to operate properly,
their pendulums must swing back and forth and their operators must get
wound up from time to time.110  Robust religious freedom is one of the “fun-
damentals” of our constitutional structure—and we have certainly seen
plenty of constitutional operators get wound up of late about religious liberty
and wide pendular swings in First Amendment jurisprudence.  But despite
the loud criticisms from the academy, we may well have come to the end of a
long constitutional swing of cases away from religious liberty protection from
1985 to 2010, and are now witnessing the start of a pendular swing back in
favor of stronger religious freedom protection.  Since 2011, the last seven
Supreme Court cases on religious freedom have all been wins for religion:
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,111 Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,112 Town of Greece v. Galloway,113
108 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 111–15.
109 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6,
1941), reprinted in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790–1966, at
2855 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966); see also LOUIS B. SOHN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
FROM ROOSEVELT’S FOUR FREEDOMS TO THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1995).
110 Letter from the Earl of Clarendon to William Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), reprinted in THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 644, 647 (George W. Carey ed., 2000) (originally
printed in the Boston Gazette, with John Adams using the pseudonym of the Earl of
Clarendon).
111 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
112 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
113 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,114 Holt v. Hobbs,115 Reed v. Town of Gilbert,116
and Zubik v. Burwell.117  And there have been parallel religious freedom vic-
tories in the European Court of Human Rights in recent years.118
Moreover, and more gravely, the blood of the many thousands of relig-
ious martyrs, especially in the genocidal attacks on communities of faith in
the Middle East, Central Africa, and Central Eurasia, is now crying out so
loudly that the world community will have to move toward concerted action
in protection of religious freedom.  As in Adams’s day, so in our own, the
United States remains positioned to take the global lead on this effort.  Most
of the core principles of religious freedom—liberty of conscience, freedom
of exercise, religious equality and pluralism, and separation of church and
state, or religion and government—forged in the course of the American
constitutional experiment are now at the heart of the international human
rights protections.  And the work of our constitutional courts remains the
envy of the world, even if individual cases are denounced.
It is essential, in our view, that these core principles of religious freedom
remain vital parts of our American constitutional life and are not diluted into
neutrality or equality norms alone, and not weakened by too low a standard
of review or too high a law of standing.  It is essential that we address the
glaring blind spots in our religious liberty jurisprudence—particularly the
long and shameful treatment of Native American Indian claims119 and the
growing repression of Muslims and other minorities at the local level, which
are not being addressed very well.120  It is essential that we show our tradi-
tional hospitality and charity to the “sojourner[s] who [are] within [our]
gates”121—migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and others—and desist from
some of the outrageous nativism and xenophobia that have marked too
114 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
115 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
116 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
117 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
118 See WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note *, at 250–51.
119 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)
(rejecting a challenge to the federal government’s logging and road construction activities
on lands sacred to several Native American tribes, even though it was undisputed that these
activities “could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices”); see also
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the state may prohibit the sacra-
mental use of peyote in Native American Church); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)
(holding that an agency’s use of a social security number does not violate the free exercise
rights of a Native American, who believed such use would impair his child’s spirit); see also
generally Kathleen Sands, Territory, Wilderness, Property, and Reservation: Land and Religion in
Native American Supreme Court Cases, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 253 (2012) (“[J]udicial
events at the intersection of land and religion have been calamitous and, for Native Ameri-
cans, full of violence and loss.”).
120 Evelyn Alsultany, Muslims Are Facing a Civil Rights Crisis in America, and It’s the Media’s
Fault, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/
2015/11/11/muslims-are-facing-a-civil-rights-crisis-in-america/; see also supra note 12.
121 Exodus 20:10.
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much of our popular and political speech of late.122  It is essential that we
balance religious freedom with other fundamental freedoms, including sex-
ual and same-sex freedoms, and find responsible ways of living together with
all our neighbors, and desisting from mutually destructive strategies of
defaming, demonizing, and destroying those who hold other viewpoints.
And it is essential that we make our landmark International Religious Free-
dom Act123 a strong focus of our international diplomacy and policy again,
not something to be ignored when economic, military, or geo-political inter-
ests get in the way, or deprecated and underfunded when other special
administration interests gain political favor.124  Now is the time for American
governments, academics, NGOs, religious and political groups, and citizens
alike to stand for strong religious freedom at home and abroad, for all peace-
able people of faith.
Religion is too vital a root and resource for democratic order and rule of
law to be passed over or pushed out.  Religious freedom is too central a pillar
of liberty and human rights to be chiseled away or pulled down.  In centuries
past—and in many regions of the world still today—disputes over religion
and religious freedom have often led to violence, and sometimes to all-out
warfare.  We have the extraordinary luxury in America of settling our relig-
ious disputes and vindicating our religious rights with patience, deliberation,
due process, and full ventilation of the issues on all sides.  We would do well
to continue to embrace this precious constitutional heritage and process, and
help others to achieve the same.  As John Adams reminds us: “[T]he eyes of
the world are upon [us].”125
122 See, e.g., ROBERT HEIMBURGER, GOD AND THE ILLEGAL ALIEN: FEDERAL UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION LAW AND A THEOLOGY OF POLITICS (forthcoming 2017).
123 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2012).
124 See, e.g., Thomas F. Farr et al., Religious Liberties: The International Religious Freedom
Act, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 469, 478–79 (2009) (“The International Religious Freedom Act
[IRFA] . . . was passed ten years ago.  That law aimed to put religious freedom advocacy at
the heart of U.S. foreign policy . . . . For the past ten years, the international religious
freedom office [and IRFA] and U.S. democracy promotion efforts have been like two ships
passing in the night—nothing to do with each other whatsoever.  This needs to change.”);
cf. Daniel Philpott, Culture War or Common Heritage? On Recent Critics of Global Religious Free-
dom, LAWFARE BOOK REVIEW (June 30, 2016), https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/
staging/2016/Philpott%20Review.pdf (reviewing ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF RELIGION (2015) and SABA MAHMOOD,
RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE: A MINORITY REPORT (2015)).
125 8 WORKS, supra note 87, at 487; see also 4 id. at 290, 292–93, 298.
